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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the leverage policies of multinational corporations (MNCs) in comparison to those of local 
corporations in the MENA region during the period between 2006 and 2012. Our results show that MNCs have 
lower leverage levels than local firms. We argue that MNCs have higher information asymmetries than other firms. 
As a result, managerial opportunism may be higher in these firms, thereby minimizing their ability to raise debt. In 
case of local firms, we show that their debt ratios are not different from other firms. Furthermore, we also show that 
our results do not hold for those multinational firms that have lower agency problems. We show that, for a given 
level of information asymmetries (operational and informational complexity), debt ratios of multinational firms are 
more than other firms. Our results show no impact of the extent of information asymmetries on debt ratios of local 
firms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
o multinational corporations (MNCs) differ from local firms in their capital structure? Does greater 
sophistication of MNCs lead them to raise more debt than local firms? Given that MNCs constitute 
an increasing proportion of global economic activity, capital structure policies adopted by MNCs 
have attracted considerable attention. Lee and Kwok (1988), for example, report that MNCs have lower leverage 
than local firms. They argue that MNCs have higher information asymmetries than their local counterparts. As a 
result, these firms are also prone to higher managerial opportunism. Given that higher debt introduces excessive 
monitoring by creditors, managers of MNCs tend to resist high leverage, thereby resulting in lower leverage in 
capital structure of MNCs. There is, however, another strand of literature that suggests the opposite. Chkir and 
Cosset (2001), for instance, document higher leverage for MNCs. They argue that geographic diversification of 
MNCs provide these firms with diversification benefit, thereby producing more stable cash flows and lowering the 
probability of default. Chkir and Cosset (2001) posit that lower default risk increases leverage on MNCs by allowing 
them to raise debt at more competitive rate. 
 
Most of the prior studies on the comparison between capital structures of MNCs and local firms have been 
conducted on the data from relatively more developed markets. An important region that has failed to attract 
attention regarding this issue is the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This paper is an attempt to fill this gap 
by documenting the relationship between the two in the MENA region (Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Tunisia, and Bahrain). The MENA region provides an interesting 
laboratory to conduct an analysis on the comparison of capital structures of MNCs and capital structures of local 
firms due to number of reasons. First, lower investor protection mechanisms in the MENA region increase the 
incentives for insiders to retain control, thereby making debt financing more preferred source of capital. However, it 
is not clear which of the two – MNCs or local firms – prefer debt over other sources of financing. Second, relatively 
lower development of stock markets in the MENA region also emasculates the ability of firms to raise external 
capital using public financial markets, thereby increasing the reliance on debt as a main source of capital. Again, it is 
not possible without empirical analysis to foresee which of the two – MNCs or local firms – will prefer debt more 
than the other. Third, and probably the most important reason pertains to the presence of concentrated ownership 
D 
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structures in the MENA region (Farooq and El Kacemi, 2011). Concentration of ownership increases the risk faced 
by controlling shareholders. Inability to diversify risk leads controlling shareholders to take those actions that can 
minimize non-diversifiable risks faced by them. One such action is reducing debt holdings of their firm. However, 
whether it is MNCs or local firms that prefer low leverage as a mechanism to reduce non-diversifiable risk is not 
clear. 
 
Using various proxies of capital structure, this paper documents significantly lower leverage among MNCs relative 
to other firms in the MENA region during the period between 2006 and 2012. Our results, for instance, show that 
total debt to total equity ratio of MNCs is 21.1522 units less than other firms. Our results are consistent with 
arguments that associate higher information asymmetries with MNCs. Lee and Kwok (1988) argue that higher 
information asymmetries may lead to managerial opportunism in MNCs. Given that the higher levels of debt invite 
increased monitoring from creditors and lenders, managers may chose to have lower levels of debt to escape 
monitoring. Consequently, MNCs have lower levels of debt. Furthermore, we also show that the extent of 
information asymmetries (operational and informational complexity) have significant impact on the capital structure 
of MNCs. We show that, for a given level of information asymmetries, debt ratios of MNCs are higher than other 
firms. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses theoretical framework for this study. Section 3 
describes the data and Section 4 provides assessment of our hypothesis. We discuss our results in Section 5 and the 
paper concludes with Section 6. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Why Multinational (Local) Firms May Have Low (High) Leverage? 
 
Prior literature cites plenty of arguments regarding lower leverage among MNCs. Some of them are as follows: 
 
• Most important of them corresponds with increased information asymmetries associated with MNCs. 
Lee and Kwok (1988) suggests that it is more difficult to monitor firms that are globally active than 
those that are purely local. They argue that higher monitoring costs not only lead to greater conflict of 
interests between debt holders and shareholders but also translate into higher agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders. In another related study, Burgman (1996) argues that MNCs have higher 
information asymmetries due to institutional, legal, and socio-cultural differences across nations. We 
argue that increased information asymmetries, eventually, translate into more severe underinvestment 
problems in MNCs relative to local firms. Given that MNCs have higher information asymmetries for 
stakeholders including financial institutions, it is expected that they are offered a relatively higher debt 
rate than local firms. It will, therefore, lead MNCs to use retained earnings as a preferred source of 
financing, thereby reducing their leverage levels. 
• Another reason that is frequently cited regarding lower leverage among MNCs pertains to increased 
profitability of MNCs relative to local firms. It is, generally, assumed that MNCs are bigger than local 
firms and are relatively more resourceful than local firms. Therefore, they have ability to generate 
more revenues. Moreover, their larger size gives them the opportunity for cost reductions through 
economies of scale which also leads to higher profitability. Higher profitability increases the reliance 
on retained earnings as a source of financing, thereby reducing the extent of leverage among MNCs. 
• Geographic diversification exposes MNCs to exchange rate risk. We argue that if exchange rate 
changes pose substantial risk to MNCs by increasing the probability of financial distress, MNCs would 
avoid undertaking large debt. Therefore, they will have lower leverage than local firms. 
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Why Multinational (Local) Firms May Have High (Low) Leverage? 
 
Some of the reasons cited for higher leverage among MNCs are as follows: 
 
• Compared to local firms that operate in a single economy, MNCs have operations in several 
economies. Performances of these economies are not perfectly correlated, thereby giving rise to 
diversification benefits for MNCs. Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) document that diversification 
across political boundaries reduces risk more than diversifying across industries within one country. 
We argue that diversification benefits make the cash flows of MNCs more stable than other firms, 
thereby lowering the probability of default. When the probability of default goes down, it becomes 
easy to obtain debt at a competitive rate. Therefore, it is possible for MNCs to have higher debt ratios 
than local firms. Our arguments are consistent with Chkir and Cosset (2001) and Fatemi (1984) who 
posit that international diversification allows for increased debt capacity. 
• Tax benefits differ from one country to the other. Given that MNCs operate in a diverse set of 
countries they have the flexibility to select the countries where it would operate with higher debt and 
where it would operate with lower debt. Therefore MNCs might have the ability to raise their leverage 
at will.  
• MNCs are probably larger in size and have a tendency for pursuing larger projects with higher 
investment requirements. Therefore MNCs debt could be expected to be higher than local firms, 
especially if we consider that their transaction cost for acquiring debt is smaller. Furthermore, larger 
projects are expected to generate have higher levels of free cash flows for MNCs. Higher levels of free 
cash flows place abundant cash at the discretion of managers, thereby resulting in agency problems. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that firms respond to high free cash flow by increasing debt to 
discipline managers. Consequently, we can expect MNCs to have higher levels of leverage.  
• It is noted that if managers are better informed than capital markets, managers of undervalued firms 
prefer to forego projects, rather than issuing equity at below optimal prices. Given that MNCs have 
more information asymmetries than local firms, they may be undervalued. Therefore, equity issuance 
may not be an option for MNCs. We argue that MNCs will prefer to issue debt to reduce some of the 
information asymmetries, thereby resulting in higher leverage relative to local firms. 
 
DATA 
 
This paper documents the differences in capital structure policies of MNCs and local firms in the MENA region. 
The sample consists of all non-financial firms listed in Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab 
Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Tunisia, and Bahrain during the period between 2006 and 2012. We consider these countries 
as the representative stock markets of the MENA region due to the availability of data. The following sub-sections 
will explain the data in more detail. 
 
Capital Structure 
 
This paper measures the capital structure by two variables: (1) Total debt to total asset ratio and (2) Total debt to 
total equity ratio. The data for the above mentioned variables is collected from the Worldscope. Table 1 documents 
the descriptive statistics for each variable during our sample period. We document relatively low level of debt in the 
region. For instance, Table 1 shows that total debt to total asset ratio is less than 20% across all years in the MENA 
region. Lower level of debt in the MENA region may be driven by a number of factors. For instance, most of listed 
firms have concentrated ownership structure in the MENA region (Farooq and El Kacemi, 2011). Concentrated 
ownership ties bulk of the wealth of controlling shareholders in a single investment. As a result, they are unable to 
fully diversify their risk (Maug, 1998). In order to minimize the risk of default, these shareholders may be reluctant 
to take on more debt. Furthermore, religious concerns may also discourage firms to take on more debt. Given that 
debt is prohibited in Islam and Islam is the dominant religion of the region, it is possible that firms decide not to take 
on excessive debt.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for capital structure 
Year Total Debt / Common Equity (%) Total Debt / Total Assets (%) 
2006 60.3250 18.1043 
2007 58.1917 17.5260 
2008 63.7875 18.8637 
2009 62.0890 18.0461 
2010 60.3221 17.5807 
2011 61.6182 17.9136 
2012 60.5546 18.0101 
 
MNCS and Local Firms 
 
Following Park et al. (2013), we define MNC as a firm that generates, at least, 20% of its sales from abroad. The 
local firm (LOCAL) is defined as a firm that generates 100% of its sales from within the country. Table 2 documents 
the descriptive statistics for MNCs and local firms during our sample period. As expected, we show that most of our 
sample firms are local firms. We also show that, on average, MNCs from the MENA region generate around 50% of 
their sales for abroad.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for multinational firms and local firms 
 Foreign Local 
Year No. of Firms Foreign Sales / Total Sale No. of Firms Foreign Sales / Total Sale 
2006 56 47.1575 169 0.0000 
2007 63 50.9991 182 0.0000 
2008 75 57.0672 205 0.0000 
2009 86 56.3302 234 0.0000 
2010 99 55.5437 348 0.0000 
2011 97 57.7696 351 0.0000 
2012 117 56.9949 241 0.0000 
 
Control Variables 
 
This paper uses a number of firm-specific characteristics as control variables. These variables are:  
 
• SIZE: It is defined as log of firm’s total assets. Prior literature presents conflicting evidence regarding 
the effect of size on capital structure. Booth et al. (2001) and Wiwattanakantang (1999) argue that 
larger firms are less prone to bankruptcy. Therefore, according to the trade-off theory, large firms have 
more debt in their capital structure. However, a large number of studies also report opposite results. 
Rajan and Zingales (1995), for instance, document that large firms have lower debt in their capital 
structure.  
• GROWTH: It is defined as the growth in total assets over the last one year. It is expected that firms 
with high growth opportunities need more financing. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Booth et al. 
(2001) document that firms with high growth opportunities have higher percentage of debt in their 
capital structure. 
• EPS: It is defined as earnings per share. As was the case with size, earnings per share also has 
contradicting relationship with capital structure. The pecking order theory suggests that firms with 
higher earnings should use internal financing as the first sources for capital. Therefore, firms with high 
earnings should have lower debt in their capital structure (Booth et al., 2001; Chen, 2004; Chakraborty, 
2010). However, according to the trade-off theory, firms with higher earnings have greater capacity to 
service debt. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between earnings per share and the amount 
of debt in capital structure. 
• RoA: It is defined as return on total assets. Trade-off theory argues that profitability pushes firms to 
have high debt ratios. Given that profitable firms have lower expected costs of bankruptcy, they should 
issue more debt. 
 
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2016 Volume 32, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 5 The Clute Institute 
We obtain the date for the above mentioned variables from the Worldscope. Table 3 documents the descriptive 
statistics (Panel A) and the correlation matrix (Panel B) for our control variables. Table 3, Panel A, reports no big 
difference in means and medians for our control variables. The only exception is EPS whose median is very close to 
zero. It suggests that most of the firms in our dataset were not very profitable. Our results in Table 3, Panel B, show 
no severe correlations between our control variables. Therefore, we can include all the variables together in any 
regression equation. 
 
Table 3. Statistics for control variables 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for control variables 
Variables Mean Median 
SIZE 12.4340 12.2434 
GROWTH 15.8061 8.7250 
EPS 2.6120 0.1550 
RoA 5.1500 4.7600 
 
Panel B. Correlation matrix for control variables 
Variables Size Growth EPS RoA 
SIZE 1.0000    
GROWTH 0.0282 1.0000   
EPS 0.2060 -0.0162 1.0000  
RoA 0.0302 0.1063 0.1878 1.0000 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This section tests whether there exists any difference between the capital structure of MNCs and the capital structure 
of local firms in the MENA region. In order to test this conjecture, we estimate the following regression equation 
with capital structure (LEV) as a dependent variable and two dummy variables representing multinational firms 
(MNC) and local firms (LOCAL) as independent variables. MNC takes the value of 1, if firm has at least 20% of its 
sales from abroad and 0 otherwise. LOCAL takes the value of 1, if firm has 100% of its sales from within the 
country and 0 otherwise. We would like to mention here that there will be no perfect multicollinearity due to the 
presence of a third group whose foreign sales are between 0% and 20% of total sales. Furthermore, we also add a 
number of variables as control variables in our regression equation. As defined earlier, these variables are: SIZE, 
GROWTH, EPS, and RoA. It is important to mention here that we use panel data regression with fixed effects for 
our analysis. Hausman test is used to decide between fixed effect and random effects. We will run the following 
regression for the two proxies of capital structure (total debt to total asset ratio and total debt to total equity) as 
defined above.  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) εRoAβEPSβGROWTHβSIZEβ
LOCALβMNCβαLEV
6543
21
+++++
++=  (1) 
 
The results of our analysis are reported in Table 4. Our results suggest that MNCs have significantly lower total debt 
to total equity ratio than other firms. We report significantly negative coefficient estimate of MNC. Our results show 
that total debt to total equity ratio of MNCs is 21.1522 units less than other firms. Our results are consistent with 
prior literature that suggests higher information asymmetries for multinational firms (Burgman, 1996; Lee and 
Kwok, 1988). Higher information asymmetries may lead to more managerial opportunism in multinational firms. 
Given that the higher levels of debt invite increased monitoring from creditors and lenders, managers may chose to 
have lower levels of debt to escape monitoring. Consequently, we should observe lower levels of debt in 
multinational firms. However, our result turn insignificant when total debt to total asset ratio is used as a proxy for 
capital structure. In this case, we report insignificantly coefficient estimate of MNC. Our results also show that local 
firms do not differ from other firms in their capital structure. We report insignificant coefficient of LOCAL for both 
proxies of capital structure. 
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Table 4. Differences between the capital structure of multinational firms and the capital structure of local firms 
Variables Total Debt / Common Equity Total Debt / Total Assets 
MNC -20.0242* -21.1522* 0.5176 0.6653 
LOCAL 7.1153 4.4705 -1.0659 -0.9540 
SIZE 36.6479*** 35.4840*** 5.1756*** 5.0823*** 
GROWTH -0.0363 -0.0315 0.0046 0.0043 
EPS -0.1304 -0.1778 0.0230 0.0229 
RoA -3.5331*** -3.5427*** -0.3143*** -0.3152*** 
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
No. of Observations 3666 3666 3764 3764 
No. of Groups 685 685 687 687 
F-Value 2.02 2.96 15.27 10.13 
R2-within 0.0256 0.0281 0.1171 0.1197 
Note: The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
There may be concerns that the results documented in Table 4 are confined to certain stocks. In order to overcome 
this concern, we split our sample into two groups, one group with size higher than the median and the other with size 
lower than the median. We re-estimate Equation (1) for both sub-samples. The results of our analysis are reported in 
Table 5. Our results show that our results hold only in small multinational firms. We report lower total debt to total 
equity ratio for small multinational firms than other small firms. We document significantly negative coefficient 
estimate of MNC for this group. Our results show that total debt to total equity ratio of multinational firms is 
21.9967 units less than other small firms. In case of total debt to total asset ratio, we report that large local firms 
have higher leverage than other large firms. We report significantly positive coefficient estimate of LOCAL for this 
group. Our results also show that big MNCs do not differ from other firms in their capital structure. We report 
insignificantly coefficient estimate of MNC for this group. 
 
Table 5. Differences between the capital structure of multinational firms and the  
capital structure of local firms in sub-samples of small and large firms 
Variables Total Debt / Common Equity Total Debt / Total Assets Small Firms Large Firms Small Firms Large Firms 
MNC -21.9967* -23.1924 -1.8756 -0.9462 
LOCAL 6.7703 3.3303 1.5055* 0.2412 
SIZE 18.7635* 46.6426*** 5.0650** 6.5329*** 
GROWTH -0.0549 -0.0230 -0.0006 0.0107*** 
EPS 10.2672** 0.1426 2.7802*** 0.0263 
RoA -1.4521*** -5.3917** -0.2911*** -0.3541*** 
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
No. of Observations 981 2685 985 2689 
No. of Groups 232 505 234 505 
F-Value 2.21 3.40 3.43 8.69 
R2-within 0.0454 0.0367 0.1247 0.1476 
Note: The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Effect of Agency Problems On the Differences Between the Capital Structure of Multinational Firms and the Capital 
Structure of Local Firms 
 
Our results have shown that MNCs headquartered in the MENA region have relatively lower level of leverage in 
their capital structure than local firms. Prior literature argues that MNCs have low leverage because of agency costs 
or the underinvestment problem (Burgman, 1996; Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003; Lee and Kwok, 1988). In this 
section, we document the impact of agency problems on the capital structure of MNCs. Controlling for agency 
problems should be able to increase the ability of MNCs to acquire more debt. In order to address this conjecture, 
we re-estimate the above regression equation after adding three variables, COMP, MNC*COMP, and 
LOCAL*COMP. We define COMP as the ratio of salary expenses to total operating expenses. Prior literature argues 
that COMP reflects operational and informational complexity of a firm (Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Hay and Davis, 2004). 
Knechel et al. (2008) argue that an increasing amount of operational and informational complexity gives rise to 
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moral hazard problems between management and minority shareholders. They also note that management has 
broader scope to control and thus manipulate information in firms with high complexity. Our modified regression 
equation takes the following form: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) εRoAβEPSβGROWTHβSIZEβ
COMP*LOCALβCOMP*MNCβCOMPβ
LOCALβMNCβαLEV
9876
543
21
+++++
+++
++=
         (2) 
 
The results of our analysis are reported in Table 6. Interestingly, our results show that for a given level of 
operational and informational complexity, MNCs have higher leverage than other firms. We report significantly 
positive coefficient of MNC*COMP. Our results show that, for a given level of complexity, total debt to total asset 
ratio of MNCs is 22.7650 units more than other firms. The result holds true for both proxies (total debt to total asset 
ratio and total debt to common equity ratio) of capital structure. Our results indicate that once we control for agency 
conflicts, managerial opportunism goes down. Consequently, managers find it more appealing to issue debt. Our 
arguments are supported by prior literature that considers information asymmetries associated with MNCs as the 
main reason behind lower leverage in these firms (Burgman, 1996; Lee and Kwok, 1988). This strand of literature 
argues that information asymmetries manifest themselves via increased managerial opportunism. However, for those 
MNCs that have lower agency problem, there is no reason to resist debt issuance. As a result, these MNCs have 
higher leverage in their capital structure. In case of local firms, we show no impact of impact of agency problems on 
capital structure. We report insignificantly coefficient of LOCAL*COMP. 
 
Table 6. Effect of operational complexity on the differences between the  
capital structure of multinational firms and the capital structure of local firms 
Variables Total Debt / Common Equity Total Debt / Total Assets 
MNC -39.9162** -43.4840** -4.6275** -4.0576* 
LOCAL -3.2604 -8.5783 0.2273 0.7410 
COMP -38.2022 -49.8618 -4.3266 -3.7413 
MNC*COMP 107.8467** 118.1912** 22.4739** 22.7650*** 
LOCAL*COMP 39.1051 50.0296 -0.0182 -0.0174 
SIZE 39.3218** 38.3166*** 4.8472*** 6.5226*** 
GROWTH -0.0450 -0.0393 0.0112* 0.0100* 
EPS 0.0036 -0.0503 0.0568 0.0578 
RoA -4.2645** -4.2792** -0.3227*** -0.3568*** 
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
No. of Observations 3156 3156 1387 1387 
No. of Groups 655 655 490 490 
F-Value 2.75 2.31 5.11 4.45 
R2-within 0.0287 0.0323 0.1391 0.1530 
Note: The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
Implications of Differences in Capital Structure On the Performance of Multinational Firms and Local Firms 
 
Prior literature argues that lower leverage in capital structure of MNCs is due to higher agency problems present in 
these firms (Doukas and Pantzalis, 2003). This strand of literature also argues that some of these agency problems 
can be offset by acquiring more leverage (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). We argue that high agency problems may 
lead to lower performance of MNCs relative to local firms. However, with acquisition of more debt, performance of 
MNCs is supposed to improve relative to local firms due to reduction in information asymmetries. In order to test 
these arguments, we estimate the following regression with firm performance (RET) as an independent variable. 
RET is the market-adjusted return and is defined as the difference between gross returns and market returns. Our 
regression equation takes the following form: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) εRoAβEPSβGROWTHβSIZEβ
LEV*LOCALβLEV*MNCβLEVβ
LOCALβMNCβαRET
9876
543
21
+++++
+++
++=
 (3) 
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The results of our analysis are reported in Table 7. Our results show that, on average, MNCs underperform local 
firms in the MENA region. We report higher coefficients of LOCAL for most of equations relative to MNC. Our 
result is intuitive in a way that MNCs are supposed to have high information asymmetries. High information 
asymmetries, usually, translate into lower performance (Mitton, 2002). Our result also shows that leverage is 
associated with better performance in the MENA region. We report significantly positive coefficient of LEV for all 
equations. Surprisingly, we also show that when MNCs take on more debt, their performance tends to go down. We 
report significantly negative coefficient of MNC*LEV for all equations. Increased leverage is supposed to reduce 
agency problems and increase firm performance. However, it is not the case for MNCs in the MENA region. 
Behavior of MNCs is in contrast to the behavior of local firms whose performance remains unaffected as the extent 
of leverage in their capital structure goes up. We report insignificant coefficient of LOCAL*LEV for all equations. 
 
Table 7. Implications of differences in capital structure on the on the performance of multinational firms and local firms 
Variables Total Debt / Common Equity Total Debt / Total Assets 
MNC 0.0795* 0.0487 0.1423*** 0.0820* 
LOCAL 0.0858*** 0.0873*** 0.0993*** 0.1004*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0008** 0.0009** 0.0027* 0.0030** 
MNC*LEVERAGE -0.0012*** -0.0011*** -0.0063*** -0.0048*** 
LOCAL*LEVERAGE -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0013 
SIZE -0.0212 -0.1336*** -0.0229 -0.1247*** 
GROWTH 0.0009*** 0.0012*** 0.0009** 0.0011** 
EPS 0.0007 0.0018 0.0007 0.0018 
RoA 0.0139*** 0.0115*** 0.0133*** 0.0108*** 
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
No. of Observations 3439 3439 3513 3513 
No. of Groups 653 653 660 660 
F-Value 10.41 45.17 10.58 45.75 
R2-within 0.0507 0.2533 0.0498 0.2509 
Note: The coefficients with 1% significance are followed by ***, coefficient with 5% by **, and coefficients with 10% by *. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper documents the difference between capital structures of multinational and local firms in the MENA region 
during the period between 2006 and 2012. Our results show that multinational firms tend to have low debt ratios (as 
measured by total debt to total asset ratio and total debt to total equity ratio) than other firms. Prior literature argues 
that multinational firms have higher information asymmetries than other firms. As a result, managerial opportunism 
may be higher in these firms, thereby minimizing the ability of these firms to raise debt. In case of local firms, our 
results indicate that their debt ratios are not different from other firms. Furthermore, we show that our result does not 
hold for those multinational firms that have lower agency problems. Our results also show that, for a given level of 
information asymmetries (operational and informational complexity), debt ratios of multinational firms are more 
than other firms. Our results show no impact of the extent of information asymmetries on debt ratios of local firms.  
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